We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a …nite set of alternatives. After knowing the chosen alternative, members may reconsider their membership by either staying or exiting. In turn, and as a consequence of the exit of some of its members, other members might now …nd undesirable to belong to the society as well. For general exit procedures we analyze the exit behavior of members after knowing the chosen alternative.
Introduction
Societies choose alternatives by well-de…ned voting rules. For instance, political parties and trade unions take up public positions on di¤erent issues; communities decide on the contribution level of their members needed to …nance common needs; permanent faculty members select new faculty members; scienti…c societies, and in general democratic societies, choose their representatives. A vast literature on social choice theory studies the properties (in terms of e¢ ciency and incentives, for instance) of alternative voting procedures used to make these choices. Voting by committees, scoring rules, and generalized median voter schemes are examples of voting rules used in di¤erent settings like those just mentioned.
But societies evolve over time. Often, this evolution is triggered precisely by the chosen alternative: some members may want to exit, if they feel that the chosen alternative makes the society undesirable to them. In turn, other members (although liking the alternative, and even after voting for it) might now …nd the society undesirable, after some of its members have already abandoned it, and so on. In this paper we contribute to the study of how the possibility that members may exit, after choosing an alternative, a¤ects the society.
This problem was …rst studied in Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2004a) . In this previous paper we study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members, from a …nite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991) . We explicitly consider the possibility that initial mem-bers of the society (founders) may want to exit, if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying founder's sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder exits. But, most societies do not use unanimity, and the members can exit whenever they want. In this paper we mainly focus on the exit decisions of members, once they have chosen an alternative.
As in Berga, Bergantiños, Massó, and Neme (2004a) we assume that members have preference orderings on the set of …nal societies, where a …nal society consists of an alternative, and a subset of initial members. We consider …nal societies to be the outcomes of a two-stage game. First, members choose an alternative x 2 X by a given voting procedure. Second, and after knowing the chosen alternative, members of the initial society decide whether to stay or exit.
We think that this two-stage game models many real situations. Even though we mainly focus on the second stage, the last section of the paper is devoted to some analysis of the two-stage game.
While voting procedures are almost always completely described by means of a voting rule, exit procedures are, in contrast, much less described by societies.
We illustrate, by means of some examples, that the exit procedure may be very important, because it may a¤ect who exits. Nevertheless, it seems that many societies (for instance scienti…c societies) do not care about the exit procedure.
Are societies wrong or is there some kind of rationality supporting that? This paper tries to provide an answer to these questions.
We …rst model exit procedures by a generic family of games, f (x)g x2X , parametrized by the chosen alternative. Namely, (x) describes the rules under which members have to decide their membership, after x has been chosen. Here we focus on voluntary membership, in the double sense that members can not be obliged to stay if they do not want to, and members can not be expelled if they want to stay. Therefore, we require that each member always has available two strategies, one guaranteeing that he stays, and the other guaranteeing that he exits.
There are many societies whose members consider undesirable the exit of other members, independently of the chosen alternative. Preference relations that satisfy this general condition will be called monotonic. Under this domain restriction we identify, for each chosen alternative x, a very reasonable …nal society consisting of x and the complementary set of what we call the exit set after x is chosen, EA (x). This set is de…ned recursively as follows. At each step, all members who would like to exit do so, given that x has been chosen, and the current society is formed by all members who in all previous steps wanted to stay. EA (x) is de…ned only through the preferences of the members and it is independent of the exit procedure (x).
We say that an equilibrium of the exit procedure is a "panic equilibrium", if it exhibits the bad coordination feature that some members exit only because they expect that other members will exit as well, although all of them would be better o¤ staying.
We prove that, independently of the exit procedure (x), we have at least an equilibrium where agents in EA (x) exit and agents in N nEA(x) stay. Moreover, we prove that the remaining equilibria of (x) are panic equilibria, in which members in EA (x) exit. We argue that EA (x) is a good prediction of exit because there is a unique plausible equilibrium outcome, which corresponds to the case where members in EA (x) exit, and members in N nEA (x) stay. Thus, there is some kind of rationality supporting the fact that many societies do not care about exit procedures. The reason is that there is a unique plausible equilibrium outcome, which is independent of the exit procedure.
Many societies do not fully specify the information about the exit decision of the members, that should be provided to the members who did not exit. We study this issue by comparing the equilibria induced by two exit procedures: simultaneous and sequential. In simultaneous exit, each member reconsiders, independently and simultaneously with the others, his membership. Then, agents have no information about the exit of the other members. In sequential exit members reconsider, sequentially and knowing the decision already taken by their predecessors, their membership.
We prove that in simultaneous exit panic equilibria can exist. If exit is sequential, for each alternative x 2 X; (x) has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, which corresponds to the unique non-panic equilibrium.
Moreover, this outcome is independent of the order in which members reconsider their membership. Then, providing information about the exit seems to be a way for avoiding panic equilibria.
In the last section we show that, even when preference pro…les are monotonic, the two-stage game may not have equilibria. But, for voting by quota, we present two results guaranteeing the existence of equilibria. However, these results are not very satisfactory, because the equilibria presented in the proof of the results are not reasonable. They are based on a coordination failure of members in the voting stage.
Finally, we exhibit a case with monotonic preferences in which, for all equilibria of the two-stage game, there exists a member playing a dominated strategy. This means that we can not …nd equilibria in which agents are vote in a reasonable way.
Before closing the introduction we comment on two recent related papers. Barberà, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) study a society that, during a number of periods, may admit in each period new members. Our paper di¤ers form theirs in many ways. The most important one is that their voters are not able to exit. Granot, Maschler, and Shalev (2002) study a similar model with expulsion; that is, current members decide in each period, whether to admit new members, and whether to expel current members for good. In contrast, our focus here is on voluntary exit because, in some settings, we …nd it to be more relevant than expulsion.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the problem in Section 2.
Section 3 is devoted to the case where members have monotonic preference pro…les. In Section 4 we study, for monotonic preference pro…les, the case where exit is simultaneous and the case where exit is sequential. Section 5 concludes by showing the existence of equilibria of the two-stage game, when the voting procedure is voting by quota, and by showing also the non-existence of undominated equilibria.
The problem
Let N = f1; :::; ng be the initial set of members of a society that must choose an alternative from a non-empty set X. We assume that n is …nite and n 2.
Generic subsets of N are denoted by S and T , elements of N by i and j, and elements of X by x and y. A …nal society [S; x] consists of the subset of members S 2 2 N that stay in the society and the chosen alternative x 2 X.
Members have preferences over 2 N X, the set of all possible …nal societies.
The preference relation of member i 2 N over 2 N X, denoted by R i , is a complete and transitive binary relation. As usual, let P i and I i be the strict and indi¤erence preference relations induced by R i , respectively. We suppose that these preference relations satisfy the following conditions:
(C1) Strictness: For all x; y 2 X and S; T 2 2 N such that i 2 S \ T and
(C2) Indifference: For all x 2 X and all S 2 2 N , i = 2 S if and only if We denote by R i the set of all such preference relations for member i and by R the Cartesian product R 1 R n . Notice that conditions (C1), (C2), and (C3) are member speci…c and therefore R i 6 = R j for di¤erent members i and j:
A preference pro…le R = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 R is an n-tuple of preference relations.
We focus on situations where …rst, members of N must choose an alternative from X: Second, and after the alternative has been chosen (and everybody knows it), members may exit. We model this situation as a two-stage game
In the …rst stage members of the initial society, according to a pre-speci…ed procedure (M; v), choose an alternative in X. Let M i be the set of possible messages of member i and de…ne After the society has chosen x 2 X; each member i 2 N reconsiders his membership by taking into account the chosen alternative, as well as his expectations concerning whether or not other members will exit. The second stage f (x)g x2X corresponds to the exit procedure, which describes what would happen if x 2 X were the alternative chosen in the voting stage, and the extensiveform game (x) is played among the set N of members. The outcome of each subgame (x) is a …nal society; namely, each terminal node of (x) is a pair [S; x] where S N represents the set of members who stay. We make the following assumptions about the exit procedure f (x)g x2X .
First, we allow the exit rules to depend on the alternative chosen in the …rst stage. This means that it is possible, for instance, that if x is chosen, then members decide simultaneously (and independently) whether to stay or to exit, while if x 0 is chosen, they decide sequentially and publicly, following some pre-speci…ed order, whether to stay or to exit.
Second, we are implicitly assuming that strategies are stationary in the sense that, while they do depend on the alternative chosen in the …rst stage, they are independent of the ballots (or on some partial information contained on them) submitted in the …rst stage. This means that at the beginning of the second stage, there are #X subgames, and (x) is indeed a subgame for each Third, in order to maintain the ordinal nature of the preference relations we consider only pure strategies. Let B i (x) be the set of all pure behavioral strategies of member i in the subgame (x) ; and let B i be the set of all pure behavioral strategies of member i in . Then,
B n (x) be the set of behavioral strategies in the subgame (x); and let B = B 1 B n be the set of behavior strategies in the game . To emphasize the role of member i's strategy in the subgame (x); we write
is the …nal society corresponding to the terminal node of achieved when x was chosen in the …rst stage, and members play b (x) in the subgame (x) : De…ne E(b(x)) as the set of members who exit after x is chosen and strategy b(x) is used; that is,
Fourth, to model voluntary exit, the family of extensive-form games f (x)g x2X must have the following two properties. First, members can not be forced to stay if they do not want to. Second, members can not be expelled whenever they want to stay. Therefore, we assume that each extensive-form game (x) has the property that, for all i 2 N , there exist two strategies b
. We now present two examples of exit procedures: simultaneous exit and sequential exit.
In simultaneous exit, each member reconsiders, independently and simultaneously, his membership. This makes sense when exit is a private decision that is kept private (for instance, when the membership has to be renewed yearly by just sending a check to the secretary of the society).
Formally, for all x 2 X; (x) is the extensive-form game in which members select, independently and simultaneously, an element of fe; sg. Of course, e means exit and s means stay. Therefore, B i (x) = fe; sg for all i 2 N and
In sequential exit, members reconsider their membership sequentially, and knowing the decision taken by their predecessors. This makes sense when membership is public. For instance, when leader A of a political party announces publicly that he is exiting the party, due to disagreements with the o¢ cial position taken by the party on a particular issue. This in turn may produce further public announcements of other leaders exiting the party, and so on.
Let
: f1; :::; ng ! N be a one-to-one mapping representing this order; namely, (t) = i means that member i is in the t th position according to the ordering . Denote by the set of all n! possible orderings, and by P re (i; ) the set of predecessors of member i in ; i.e.,
Given 2 ; we consider the exit procedure where for all x 2 X; (x) is the extensive-form game in which each member, sequentially (in the order given by ) and knowing the decision of his predecessors, selects an element of fe; sg.
If member i chooses e; he is not in the …nal society, whereas if he chooses s he is.
To describe the set of pure behavioral strategies of members, take i 2 N , x 2 X, and 2 . When member i must decide, he knows the decisions already taken by members in P re (i; ). Thus, we can identify the information sets of member i with 2 P re(i; ) ; the family of subsets of P re (i; ) : In this case, T 2 2 P re(i; ) represents the subset of members in P re (i; ) who have already decided to stay. Thus, we can write the set of pure behavioral strategies of
In contrast with the voting procedure, societies usually specify neither the rules on how members can exit, nor the information that should be provided to members about the exit decision of other members. The next examples show that this may be a very important issue.
In these examples, as in other examples of the paper, we consider the problem studied by Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) , where a society has to choose, from a given set K of candidates, a subset of new members; 1 therefore,
Moreover, assume that each member has to vote for a subset of
k 2 vc q (S 1 ; :::; S n ) if and only if # fi 2 N j k 2 S i g q: Example 1. Let N = f1; 2; 3g be a society whose members have to decide whether or not to admit candidate y as a new member (i:e:, X = f?; yg).
Consider the preference pro…le R 2 R, additively representable by the following ; where the number in each cell represents the utility each member i 2 N assigns to members in N , as well as to candidate y (we normalize by setting u i (?) = 0 for all i 2 N and by saying that if i = 2 T then, the utility of [T; x] is 0). That is, for all i 2 N , all x; x 0 2 f?; yg, and all
It is easy to see that the extensive-form game (y) with simultaneous exit has two Nash Equilibria (N E): b (y) = (e; s; s) ; inducing the …nal society [f2; 3g ; y] ;
and b 0 (y) = (s; e; s) ; inducing [f1; 3g; y] :
Example 1 shows that, even if the exit procedure is speci…ed, it is not possible to uniquely predict the set of members who will stay.
Example 2. Let N = f1; 2; 3g be a society whose members have to decide whether or not to admit candidate y as a new member (i.e., X = f?; yg).
Assume that the voting procedure is voting by quota 1 and the exit procedure is sequential. Consider the preference pro…le R 2 R, additively representable by the following table Similarly, (y) has a unique SP N E; which we denote by b (y). Moreover,
We now prove that the game Using arguments similar to those used with 0 ; we can prove that has
These examples suggest that the exit procedure may have very important effects on the …nal society. The set of members who exit depends on it. Moreover, members'votes also depend on it (for instance, in Example 2, under member 3 has an incentive to vote for y; but under 0 his incentive is just the opposite).
Nevertheless, it seems that many societies (for instance scienti…c societies) do not care about the exit procedure. A natural question that arises is, why? Two answers are possible. First, societies are making a mistake and they should care about it. Second, there is some kind of rationality supporting the fact that the exit procedure is not so important, as the above examples suggest. In the next section we try to answer this question.
Monotonic preferences
There are many societies whose members consider the exit of other members undesirable, independently of the chosen alternative. For instance, scienti…c societies want to become larger, political parties do not want to lose a¢ liates, countries signing international agreements to protect the environment (like the Kyoto protocol), want to have more countries signing the protocol, and so on.
Preference relations that satisfy this general condition will be called monotonic.
Formally, a preference relation R i 2 R i is monotonic if for all x 2 X and all
A preference pro…le R = (R 1 ; :::; R n ) 2 R is monotonic if, for all i 2 N , the preference relation R i is monotonic.
Notice that monotonicity does not impose any condition when comparing two …nal societies with di¤erent chosen alternatives. In particular, monotonicity admits the possibility that member i prefers to belong to a smaller society; namely,
is compatible with monotonicity, as long as x 6 = x 0 . But monotonicity also admits that member i prefers to exit if the chosen alternative is perceived as being very bad; namely,
is compatible with monotonicity too.
We now de…ne the set EA (x). We will argue that, independently of the exit procedure (x), the set EA (x) is a good prediction of the exit after x has been chosen. The de…nition of EA (x) is recursive and as follows.
First, we de…ne EA 1 (x) as the set of members who want to exit, when x is chosen and the other members stay. Formally,
Let t 1 and assume EA t 0 (x) has been de…ned for all t 0 such that 1 t 0 t.
Then,
Let t x be either equal to 1 if EA 1 (x) = ? or else be the smallest positive integer satisfying the property that EA tx (x) 6 = ? but EA tx+1 (x) = ?: Notice that t x is well de…ned and t x n: Then, the exit set after x is chosen is
Observe that EA (x) depends only on the preference pro…le R; and not on the exit procedure used in the second stage of : Note also that we can de…ne EA(x)
for any preference pro…le R 2 R, not necessarily monotonic.
The following example illustrates the de…nition of EA (x).
Example 3. Let N = f1; 2; 3g be a society whose members have to decide whether or not to admit candidate y as a new member (i:e:, X = f?; yg).
Consider the preference pro…le R 2 R, additively representable by the following It is easy to see that EA 1 (y) = f3g, EA 2 (y) = f2g, EA 3 (y) = f1g, and EA 4 (y) = ?. Thus, EA (y) = f1; 2; 3g. Moreover, EA (?) = ?:
The next Proposition states that, independently of the exit procedure de…n-ing the extensive-form game (x), members in EA (x) always exit at any N E of (x). Moreover, for any exit procedure (x) ; there is a N E strategy b (x)
of (x) ; such that EA (x) coincides with the set E (b (x)) of members who exit when b (x) is played.
Proposition 1. Assume preferences are monotonic. Given x 2 X and any
Proof. (a) Let b (x) be a N E strategy of (x) : We proceed by induction.
We …rst prove that EA 1 (x) E (b (x)) : Suppose not. Then, there exists
Assume member i plays b Assume that for all t
. We now prove that
By the induction hypothesis,
Since preferences are monotonic,
Thus,
which contradicts the fact that i 2 EA t+1 (x). Then, for all t
; x] ; which means that member i cannot improve.
Since i 2 EA (x) there exists t; 1 t t x ; such that i 2 EA t (x) : Hence,
Thus, member i cannot improve either.
, member i cannot improve either. 
A natural question that arises is whether or not E (b (x)) = EA (x) holds
for any x 2 X, any exit procedure (x); and any N E strategy b (x) in (x).
Example 4 shows that the answer is no.
Example 4. Let N = f1; 2; 3g be a society whose members have to decide whether or not to admit candidate y as a new member (i:e:, X = f?; yg).
Consider the preference pro…le R 2 R, additively representable by the following exits because the society becomes unacceptable when candidate y enters. Once candidate y enters and member 3 exits, member 1 wants to stay if member 2 stays, and exit if member 2 exits. Symmetrically for member 2. The interpretation of b 0 (y) is the following: member 1 exits because he thinks that member 2 exits, and member 2 exits because he thinks that member 1 exits.
The equilibrium b 0 (y) in (y) of Example 4 shows that exit procedures may
have N E exhibiting a coordination failure. Namely, there are equilibria in which members exit only because they think that other members will exit as well, but all of them would prefer that all stay. We call them panic equilibria.
Formally, b (x) is a panic equilibrium of (x) if b (x) is a N E of (x) and there exists another N E strategy b
Let b(x) be a panic equilibrium of (x); and let b 0 (x) be a N E such that
? prefer to stay with members of
T ), and members in
for all i 2 S (b (x)).
Theorem 1 below states that, provided that preferences are monotonic, for all x 2 X (and independently of the exit procedure (x)), the exit induced by a non-panic equilibrium coincides with EA(x). Hence, there is only one …nal society induced by all non-panic equilibria, [N nEA (x) ; x] : Moreover, this …nal society is the unique one that is not Pareto dominated by any other …nal society induced by other equilibria.
Theorem 1. Assume preferences are monotonic. Given x 2 X and any
Proof. (a) It is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1 and the de…n-ition of panic equilibrium.
Take i 2 N . We distinguish three cases:
Case 2: and all agents in N nEA(x) stay. In general, it is possible to …nd other N E of (x), but in all of them, all agents in EA (x) exit. Theorem 1 says that in these additional N E there is necessarily a group of members who coordinate on a bad equilibrium. These members exit only because they think that other members will exit as well, but all of them would prefer that all stay. These equilibria are based on a coordination failure. Hence, we …nd that the set EA (x) is a better prediction of the set of members who exit, once x is chosen. Thus, [N nEA (x) ; x] seems to be the most plausible …nal society.
Before we pose the following question: why do many societies seem to not care about exit procedures? Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 provide an answer when members have monotonic preferences and they do not coordinate on a bad equilibrium. For many societies (for instance, scienti…c societies and political parties), both assumptions seem appropriate.
Two exit procedures: simultaneous and sequential
In this section we study the relationship between EA (x) and plausible outcomes of the extensive-form game, when preferences are monotonic and exit is either simultaneous or sequential. We show that if exit is simultaneous, EA (x) coincides with the outcome of iterative elimination of dominated strategies (IEDS).
If exit is sequential, for all x 2 X and 2 ; (x) has a unique SP N E; whose outcome coincides with [N nEA (x) ; x] :
Usually, societies do not fully specify the information that should be provided to members about the exit decision of other members. In this section we suggest that to provide such information has the positive e¤ect of preventing panic equilibria. We do so by proving that, if members have monotonic preferences then, panic equilibria may exist with simultaneous exit, whereas with sequential exit they never exist.
Simultaneous exit procedure
First, note that panic equilibria can exist with simultaneous exit. In Example 4, (e; e; e) is a panic equilibrium strategy in (y) :
We now show that EA (x) is related with IEDS: Given x 2 X and i 2 N we say that b
Given x 2 X and i 2 N we denote by B nd i (x) the set of strategies of member i that survive the process of IEDS.
2 The next proposition states that, given x 2 X, the action s of member i 2 EA (x) in the simultaneous game (x) does not survive the process of IEDS.
Proposition 2. Assume preferences are monotonic. Then, for all x 2 X;
Proof. We …rst prove that for all i 2 EA
It is easy to see that
Then, s is dominated and hence, B nd i (x) = feg. Assume that the strategy s of member i 2 N is eliminated in the …rst step of IEDS. We take b j (x) = s for all j 2 N n fig : Then,
We now prove that for all i 2 EA
Thus; s is dominated, which means that B nd i (x) = feg : Using arguments similar to those used with EA 1 (x) ; we conclude that, if strategy s of member i 2 N is eliminated in the second step of IEDS, then
Repeating this argument, we conclude that B nd i (x) = feg for all i 2 EA t (x) and t = 3; :::; t x : Moreover, if strategy s of member i 2 N is eliminated in the t th step of IEDS, i 2 EA t (x) : Then,
We only need to prove that if i = 2 EA (x) then, s 2 B nd i (x) : We already know that no strategy s corresponding to some member in N n EA (x) has been eliminated in the …rst t x steps. We now prove that in step t x + 1 of IEDS, no strategy s can be eliminated.
If strategy e of member i was eliminated, then s can not be eliminated in step t x + 1: Assume that strategy e was not eliminated. Consider
Notice that all these strategies are available for members in step
Hence, s cannot be eliminated.
Using similar arguments to those used for t x + 1; we can prove that no strategy s can be eliminated in step t (t > t x + 1) of IEDS. 
Sequential exit procedure
We …rst prove that for any preference pro…le (not necessarily monotonic), any alternative x; and any ordering , the subgame (x) has always a unique SP N E.
For societies trying to decide how to organize themselves, this constitutes an obvious advantage of the sequential exit procedure over the simultaneous one.
Proposition 3. For all x 2 X and all 2 ; the subgame (x) has a unique SP N E.
Proof. Let x 2 X and assume, without loss of generality, that for all i 2 N , (i) = i: Let T 2 2 P re(n; ) be an information set of member n:
Thus, in any SP N E of (x) the strategy of member n is
Next, let T 2 2 P re(n 1; ) be an information set of member n 1:
Thus, in any SP N E of (x) the strategy of member n 1 is
Now, and since (x) has perfect information, using a conventional backwards induction argument together with (C2), the existence of a unique SP N E strategy b (x) of (x) follows.
Since for each x 2 X the subgame (x) has a unique SP N E strategy
Therefore, there is no panic equilibria with sequential exit for general preferences (not necessarily monotonic). That is an advantage of the sequential exit over the simultaneous exit.
We next prove that whenever preferences are monotonic and the exit procedure is sequential, for all orderings 2 , EA (x) coincides with the set of members who exit in the SP N E of (x). Therefore, for all x 2 X, the SP N E outcome of (x) coincides with [N nEA (x) ; x] :
Theorem 2. Assume preferences are monotonic, x 2 X, 2 , and b (x) is the unique SP N E of (x). Then, E (b (x)) = EA (x) :
Proof. To simplify notation we assume, without loss of generality, that for all i 2 N , (i) = i: De…ne recursively the following sets. First, set S 1 = ?:
Assume that, for all j < i, S j has been de…ned. De…ne S i as
We must prove that b i (x) S i = e when i 2 EA (x) ; and
Assume that N n EA (x) = fi 1 ; :::; i l g and i j < i j+1 for all j = 1; :::; l 1: We now prove that given T l = fi 1 ; :::; i l 1 g, b i l (x) T l = s: Since fi l + 1; :::; ng EA (x), using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 1 we can show that, independently of the action chosen by i l , members of fi l + 1; :::; ng will play e in any SP N E. Then, if i l chooses s, the …nal society is T l [ fi l g ; x ; whereas if i l chooses e, the …nal society is T l ; x : Since
We now prove that, given T l 1 = fi 1 ; :::; i l 2 g, b i l 1 (x) T l 1 = s: Using similar arguments to those used in the proof of Proposition 1 we can show that, independently of the action chosen by i l 1 , members of fi l 1 + 1; :::; ng \ EA (x) will play e in any SP N E. Then, if i l 1 chooses s, the information set T l of i l will be reached. But, since we have already proven that member
If member i l 1 chooses e; the …nal society will be [T ; x] where
Repeating this argument we obtain that b ij (x) T j = s for all j = 1; :::; l:
Since T j = S ij whenever i j 2 N n EA (x), the result follows immediately.
Remark 4. The conclusion of Theorem 2 does not necessarily hold if preferences are not monotonic. We have seen in Example 2 two di¤erent orders whose SP N E outcomes are di¤erent.
Often, societies do not fully specify the information that should be provided to members about the exit decision of other members. What is the impact in the N E outcome of the exit procedure? Since we are considering all possible exit procedures, this is a di¢ cult question to answer. We have analyzed two extreme cases: the case where no information is available, and the case where all information is available. The …rst one corresponds to simultaneous exit. As we have seen, panic equilibria can exist in this case. The second one corresponds to the sequential exit associated to a given order 2 : In this case, when member i takes his decision, he knows exactly the decisions made by previous members in the order . We have proved that, independently of ; there exists a unique
induced by a non-panic equilibrium strategy.
The analysis of these two extreme cases suggests that providing information about who exits may avoid panic equilibria. The following example shows that, if (M; v) is voting by quota 1, the set of N E of with simultaneous exit may be empty.
Example 6. Let N = f1; 2; 3g be a society whose members have to decide whether or not to admit candidate y as a new member (i:e:, X = f?; yg). Assume that the voting procedure (f?; yg N ; vc 1 ) is voting by quota 1 and the exit procedure is simultaneous. Consider the preference pro…le R 2 R, additively representable by the following table which contradicts the assumption that b is a N E of . Therefore, in any N E of ; candidate y is admitted and member 3 stays. Now, the simultaneous strategic decisions of members 1 and 2 in the subgame The next example shows that the set of undominated N E of may be empty, even when members have monotonic preferences.
Example 7. Consider a society N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, whose members have to decide whether or not to admit as new members candidates x and y. Suppose that the voting procedure (f?; fxg; fyg; fx; ygg N ; vc 1 ) is voting by quota one, and the preference pro…le R 2 R is representable by the following table It is straightforward to check that EA (?) = ?; EA (x) = f3g ; EA (y) = f3g ;
and EA (fx; yg) = f3; 4g. Then, for member 1, fyg is dominated by ? and fx; yg is dominated by fxg : For member 2; fxg is dominated by ? and fx; yg is dominated by fyg : For members 3 and 4; fxg ; fyg ; and fx; yg are dominated by ?: Therefore, the undominated strategies are fxg and ? for member 1; fyg and We now check that none of the four strategy pro…les are N E of . Therefore, the set of undominated N E of is empty. Moreover, it is easy to check that the set of N E of is equal to fm 2 M j # fi 2 N j x 2 m i g 2 and # fi 2 N j y 2 m i g 2g .
